Scientific American
On 19 January 2024, Scientific American published an opinion piece by the U.S. Department of Defense's All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) former Director Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick. It was titled "Here's what I learned as the U.S. government's UFO Hunter," and covered a range of items. However, for the purposes of this article I wish to focus on the mention of Special Access Programs by Kirkpatrick.
Firstly then, a lengthy quote from the article:
"In 2009 then Senator Harry Rid asked the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to set up a SAP (special access program) to protect the alleged UAP/UFO material that AATIP proponents believed the USG was holding. The SECDEF declined to do so after a review by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), and DIA concluded that not only did no such material exist, but taxpayer money was being inappropriately spent on paranormal research at Skinwalker Ranch in Utah. This is well documented in open sources, particularly in recently available on DIA's electronic FOIA Reading Room.
After the negative response by SECDEF, Senator Reid then enlisted the help of then Senator Joeph Lieberman to request that the Department of Homeland Secuity (DHS) set up an SAP for the same purpose. The administrative SAP proposal package was informed by the same individuals who had been associated with AATIP. AARO's archival research has located the administrative proposal for the DHS SAP, complete with the participants, which has been declassified and is being reviewed for public release..."
The 2009 Reid letter
Kirkpatrick, inter alia, wrote:
"In 2009 then Senator Harry Rid asked the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to set up a SAP (special access program) to protect the alleged UAP/UFO material that AATIP proponents believed the USG was holding."
I will provide the full text of the letter in order that the reader may make their own judgement as to whether or not, Kirkpatrick's assertion above is a correct reading of the content of the letter.
"Beginning this past September, the US Senate has mandated that the Defense Intelligence Agency assesses far-term foreign advanced aerospace threats to the United States. The scope of program interest covers from the present out to forty years and beyond. In order to further our effort in recognizing emerging disruptive aerospace technology, technical studies are being conducted in regard to advanced lift, propulsion, the use of unconventional materials and controls, signature reduction, weaponry, human interface and human effects.Since the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) and study were first commissioned much progress has been made with the identification of several highly sensitive, unconventional aerospace related findings.Given the current rate of success, the continued study of these subjects will likely lead to technological advancements that, in the immediate near-term will require extraordinary protection. Due to the sensitivities of the information surrounding aspects of this program, I require your assistance in establishing a Restricted Special-Access-Program (SAP) with Bigoted Access List for specific portions of the AATIP.In order to support this national effort, a small but highly specialized cadre of Department of Defense (DoD) and private sector individuals are necessary. These individuals must be specialized in the areas of advanced sciences, sensors, intelligence/counterintelligence, and advanced aerospace engineering. Given the likelihood that these technologies will be applied to future systems, involving spaceflight, weapons, communications and propulsion, the standard management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are not sufficient. Even the use of conventional SAP protocols will not adequately ensure that all aspects of the project are properly secured.Although not every aspect of AATIP requires restricted SAP read-on, the following portions should be maintained at the Restricted SAP level.'The methodology used to identify, acquire, study and engineer the advanced technologies associated with AATIP.Specific methodologies used to study unconventional technology may require nuanced approaches that will undoubtedly be of significant interest if not a top priority for adversarial Foreign Intelligence Security Services (FISS).Undue attention by government or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP or any international interest will directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and perhaps threaten the overall success of the program.Allocation of personnel, support and oversight.Due to the highly specialized nature of the personnel involved with AATIP, the overt acknowledgement of their participation in the program will lead to an unnecessary security and counterintelligence risk.Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within Dod, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary from time to time based on demonstrated subject matter expertise. Adequate protection of their identities and affiliation is critical to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.Without the appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost associated with a compromise would be significantly higher than the cost associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP.Protection of industry partners and participation is critical. Public awareness of an industry's AATIP affiliation may discourage that industry's further participation with the US Government in this program.Applications and engineeringThe nuanced manner in which some of these technologies will be collected, engineered and applied by the US may require senior level government approval. These decision makers must be afforded the necessary time to make strategic decisions by restricting access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program to those on a strict Bigoted List.Associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within the worlds of quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravitics and thermodynamics. Given that all of these have the potential to be used for catastrophic effects by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required.Due to the expertise required to carry out the objectives of this program, we will require a small, specialized group of Dod personnel, who are dedicated to performing the SAP-related functions and executing programmatic requirements within the program. It is essential that the Government & military personnel who are already involved with this program are assigned to further support this program in a Restricted SAP capacity (See Attachment 1). These individuals all currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.
Ultimately the results of AATIP will not only benefit the US Government but I believe will directly benefit Dod in ways not yet imagined. The technological insight and capability gained will provide the US with a distinct advantage over any foreign threats and allow the US to maintain its preeminence as a world leader.
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration of this request. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Bob Herbert of my staff at (202) 437-3162."
Attachment 1
Sponsoring agency: Undetermined (DEPSECDEF).
Component level SAP central office.
Unclassified nickname: Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP).
Program length: FY09-FY13 (Preliminary).
Program funding: FY09- O&M, FY10-FY13- TBD.
SAP category designation: Intelligence, Dod Acquisition.
FY10 Preliminary Bigot List of Government personnel:
1. Honorable William Lynn III, Dep Dir of defense (Govt)
2. Honorable Senator Harry Reid of Nevada (Govt)
3. Honorable Senator Daniel Inouve of Hawaii (Govt)
4-11 Redacted.
FY10 Preliminary Bigoted List of Contractor Personnel funded under the AATIP
1-3 Redacted.
This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemptions 1 and 5 apply."A DHS SAP
While the 2009 approach by Senator Reid to the Department of Defense for a SAP has been known for quite a while, I was not aware of the request for a SAP for DHS to conduct an Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) like program.
Courtesy Amazon Books |
However, it should be noted that the 2021 book "Skinwalkers at the Pentagon" authored by James T. Lacatski, Colm Kelleher and George Knapp, references the fact that:
"...on February 7, 2011 Lacatski gave a very in depth briefing to colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate.."
Lacatski et al went on to say:
"At this point in time, the opportunity arose for DHS to receive $10 million in FY13 funding due to a collaborative effort between Senator Harry Reid and Joe Lieberman (then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs.)"
Ultimately, DHS did not accept the funding. I could find no reference to a DHS SAP in the book. I therefore turned to Lacatski et al's 2023 book "Inside the Government's Covert UFO Program: Initial Revelations." I found no reference to Senator Lieberman or a DHS SAP request.
In conclusion:
We await the public release of the documentation concerning an DHS SAP mentioned in Kirkpatrick's article, to provide us with yet another link in the AAWSAP story.
Update: 22 April 2024
The AARO website recently published details from the Department of Homeland Security on their proposed project named "Kona Blue" which was to extend the work of the former AAWSAP. The first Lacatski et al book "Skinwalkers at the Pentagon" appendix two, had previously provided details of this proposed second version of AAWSAP, but without giving its code name "Kona Blue."
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