Thursday, August 9, 2018

AATIP documents found on US website

Introduction

On the morning of 7 August 2018 my attention was drawn to the existence of a number of documents, and videos about the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP.) The story broke when Twitter user @Jay09784691 posted several tweets about them, thus placing them in the public domain.

The items

Below, I present a summary of the items. I have chosen not to post any of the images in this post, as some provide personal information about certain individuals. I will however use the names of individuals who have self identified themselves as members of the To The Stars Academy. 

An image of a package

There is an image of a white padded bag with www.securityBag.com on it. It has 'To: L. Elizondo handwritten on it in blue and 'Department/Mail Station.' It is 'From: [handwritten name I choose not to type here]'in blue ink,  then 'Date/time' printed on it. Below all of this is handwritten 'Chris Mellon 1600 9/7/17.'

Comment: This is suggestive of an internal DoD security package delivering items from [Unnamed] to Luis Elizondo, which then was delivered to Chris Mellon at 1600hrs on 7 September 2017.


An image of four coloured compact discs

There is an image of four green coloured compact discs. These are labelled 'Disc 1 of 4;' "Disc 2 of 4;' 'Disc 3 of 4;' Disc 4 of 4.' All of the CDs have printed on them 'This medium is Unclassified US Government Property.' By the printed word 'Date' appears the characters 9/5 handwritten.

Comment: If 9/5 is a date, meaning 5 September (2017?) then this fits in with the white package date shown as 7 September 2017.


AATIP brief

There are seven jpeg files, each labelled as aatip-brief-pdf-orig, numbered 1-4, then 6-8. Missing is a jpeg file number page5. When opened, the files appear as a series of briefing slide, labelled 1-4, then 7-9. Slides numbered 5 and 6 are missing. The contents of the slides are as follows:

Slide 1 - 'Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program.'

Slide 2 - 'Purpose'

* Inform the Deputy Secretary of Defense of ongoing activities relating to AATIP

* Request establishment of a Restricted Special-Access-Program with a Bigoted Access list for specific portions of AATIP

* Re-assign billets, resources, and recommended personnel to a dedicated DoD AATIP support office

* Establish a DoD AATIP Reporting Chain of Command

Slide 3 - 'AATIP Mission'

* To further identify, understand, and take advantage of a generation of highly advanced technology and principles that may be currently employed by other countries, actors or entities and use this technology to the benefit of the Department and provide the US with a decisive advantage over adversaries and threats

AATIP vision

An integrated capability that provides the Department with "Beyond Next Generation"technologies and understanding, particularly in the areas of aerospace.

Slide 4 - 'AATIP Preliminary Assessments.'

* Realization that many of the findings, if used against the United States, may prove to be decisive "game changers" for our country

* Preliminary evidence indicates that the United States is incapable of defending itself towards some of these technologies

* Several unconventional findings require further investigation in order to determine the full scope of the threat and their capabilities to be either exploited or defeated

* The nature of these technologies and the fact that the United States has no countermeasures is considered Highly Sensitive

Slide 7 'Contract focus.'

AATIP technical studies in the following areas;
Lift; Materials; Propulsion; Configuration/structure; Control; Human Interface; Human Effects; Spatial/temporal translation; Armament (RF and DEW); Signature Reduction (optical, infrared, radiofrequency, acoustic); Technology Integration

* Emphasis on unconventional technology capabilities 40 years in the future and beyond (not extrapolation of current technology)

* Investigate legitimacy of currently observed phenomena

* Are they achieved by current physics and engineering?

* If not, what research is required to achieve?

Slide 8 'FY09 Technical Reports.'

This slide is a table divided into 'Title;' 'Author;' and 'Affiliation.'

Comment: It lists 26 items which are recognizable as 26 out of the 38 known Defense Intelligence Reference Documents previously discussed in this blog. The titles shown here versus the 'leaked' list from George Knapp and Matt Adams, are different in many instances.

Slide 9 'DoD Threat Scenarios.' '(AATIP sub-focus Areas.'

The scenario exists for an enemy of the United States to manipulate both physical and cognitive environments in order to penetrate US facilities, influence decision makers, and compromise national security.

- Psychotronic weapons

- Cognitive Human Interface (CHI)

- Penetration of solid surfaces

- Instantaneous sensor disassemble

- Alteration/Manipulation of biological organism

- Anomalies in the Space/Time construct

- Unique cognitive human interface experiences

Dod Advantages

- Dod has been involved in similar experiments in the past

- Dod has relationships with renowned subject matter experts

- DoD controls several facilities where activities have been detected

What are considered "phenomena" is now quantum physics.

Comments: 

1. Slide 7. Contract focus. The listed areas of interest are the same ones to be found on the August 2008 Defense Intelligence Agency's solicitation for work to be undertaken on the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program.

2. Slide 8. FY09 Technical Reports. The FY09 ended 30 September 2009. Can we say that the briefing slides were prepared and used in 2009? The wording of slide 2 'Request establishment of a Restricted Special-Access-Program with a Bigoted Access list for specific portions of AATIP' is strongly reminiscent of the similar wording expressed by Senator Reid's letter dated 24 June 2009 sent to the DoD. 


A multiple page account by a Nimitz pilot witness

There is a multiple page interview notes with one of the 2004 Nimitz incident pilots. This is an almost exact copy of a document on the TTSA website. Differences are that the US website documents are unredacted and provide personal details of individuals involved in the incident.

A copy of Elizondo's resignation letter

No one to date, has been successful in obtaining a copy of Luis Elizondo's letter of resignation, yet there was a copy on the US website.

The letter (actually a Memorandum) was on 'Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 5000 Defense Pentagon, Washington-DC 20301-5000' letterhead.

'Memorandum for: Record
Subject: Letter of resignation & Differed Retirement

Mr Secretary

It has been my sincere honour and pleasure to have served with some of America's finest men and women in both peace time and in war. For over 22 years, I have been blessed to learn from, and work with world-class leadership, you certainly among the very best.

With that in mind, bureaucratic challenges and inflexible mindsets continue to plague the Department at all levels.This is particularly true regarding the controversial topic of anomalous aerospace threats. Despite overwhelming evidence at both the unclassified and classified levels, certain individuals in the Department remain strongly opposed to further research on what could be a tactical threat to our pilots, sailors and soldiers, and perhaps even an existential threat to our national security. In many instances, there seems to be a direct correlation the phenomena exhibits with respect to our nuclear and military capabilities. The Department must take seriously the many accounts by the Navy and other services of unusual aerial systems interfering with military weapon platforms and displaying beyond next generation capabilities. Underestimating or ignoring these potential threats is not in the Department no matter the level of political contention. There remains a vital need to ascertain capability and intent of these phenomena for the benefit of the armed forces and the nation.

For this reason, effective 4 October 2017, I hereby submit my resignation in the hopes it will encourage you to ask the hard questions: 'who else knows?' 'what are their capabilites', and 'why aren't we spending more time and effort on the issue?' As I transition to a new chapter of my life, please know it has been an honor and privilege of a lifetime to serve with you. rest assure (sic) no matter where the path of life may lead me, I will always have the best interest of the Department and the American people as my guiding principle.

Luis D Elizondo
Director
National Programs Special Management Staff
OUSD(I)

Comment:

Research on the Internet lead me to deduce that the National Programs area lay in the Sensitive Activities Directorate, under the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for HUMINT, Counterintelligence and Security, Department of Defense. 

Three videos

There were three video files on the US website:

flir_981.mp4  3939kb  1min 16 secs

gimble-video..._492.mp4 7100kb  34 secs

gofast..._737.mp4  9370 kb  34 secs

There appear to be very close to the three videos, on the TTSA website.

In summary

However, the exposure of this AATIP material came about, it has provided us with further insight into the program, which should allow better targeting of future FOIA requests. 

6 comments:

  1. "Research on the Internet lead me to deduce that the National Programs area lay in the Sensitive Activities Directorate, under the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for HUMINT, Counterintelligence and Security, Department of Defense."

    I have also been trying to figure out what that "National Programs Special Management Staff" alias NPSMS was actually doing.

    So far I have found that info about the organization structure you mentioned, then this statement:

    "The NPSMS is the office responsible for administering the special access program for the Office of Military Commissions"
    http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(TRANS8Dec2017-MERGED).pdf

    And this job application:
    https://cybersecjobs.com/index.php?page=view_job&post_id=257299

    Which includes e.g. this:
    "Work directly for the National Program Special Management Staff (NPSMS) leadership and will support efforts to assess, develop, coordinate and implement strategic guidance/policies that directly affect program security"


    This might also have some relevant info:
    https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2013/02/dod_saps/

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Parabunk, thanks for all this excellent research. It is however, frustrating to know that others know exactly what is going on; perhaps already has all the AATIP material, and will not share it.

      Delete
  2. Your meticulous work on this and other issues Keith Basterfield is greatly appreciated

    ReplyDelete
  3. Here's my transcription of the text on the one readable page in TTSA's new "ADAM project" video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MzrnJtNbwZE), before they decide to pull the video tomorrow just for the lulz...

    7/19/2018

    Microstructural Analysis of Samples Received from Bennie Foggin

    R. Olson, L. Martins, M. Topolski

    Project Notes

    We received samples of aluminum from Bennie Foggin labelled "Ohio Ed's metal sample" (hereafter labelled SM006) and "Rendlesham Forest Sample" (hereafter labelled SM007). The Ed's metal sample was a small chunk less than about 1 cubic centimeter. The Rendlesham sample was a collection of ["relatively thin"?] shavings with size on the order of 1 mm. We have no knowledge of the history of Ed's metal specimen. We were well aware of the Rendlesham story given its significant media exposure over the last couple of decades, but have no knowledge of this particular sample or how it was collected.

    Specimen Notes

    Samples were mounted in epoxy, initially ground using SiC paper to reveal a cross-section of the microstructure, then polished using water-based diamond suspensions and a Buehler automatic polishing wheel. Samples were then cleaned using ethanol in an ultrasonic bath and coated with a conductive coating if Au-Pd to prepare for analysis via Scanning Electron Microscopy and Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy. Samples were analysed using a Tescan Vega 3 SEM equipped with an Oxford XMax [?] EDS. All images were captured in backscatter mode.

    Results and Discussion

    The analytical results for all spectra are included in two summary tables below. The first is provided in weight percent, the second in atomic percent. The first seven spectra (1-7) pertain to Ed's metal analyses, and the final ten spectra (8-17) pertain to the Rendlesham analyses.

    Ed's metal

    Figure 1 shows a low magnification image of the surface prepared for analysis. Sites A and B were analysed in detail. Figure 3 is a close-up of site A, where a large section of the alloy was scanned by EDS to obtain an estimate of the average composition. This material has a fairly simple composition. The relatively low amount of silicon is likely the result of impurity, not an intentional addition. It is difficult to ["produce"?] aluminum (Al) with silicon (Si) and iron (Fe) contents below about 0.4 wt%. We did not see Fe ["at this level"?] in spectrum 1, but did pick up a precipitate in spectrum 3 with a high Fe content, so it could ["be"?] ["we"?] [?] did not pick up the trace Fe in spectrum 1. The magnesium (Mg) concentration of 0.35 wt% is likely an intentional addition. Mg is a very common additive in Al alloy. A small amount of oxygen (O) ["was"?] ["pick"?] ["up,"?] ["likely"?] trace amounts of oxides in the alloy resulting from processing issues. The ["only"?] ["other"?] ["element"?] ["we"?] ["detected"?] at this ["level"?] was silver (Ag), which is a very unusual component. ["Historically"?], Ag is [?] with copper (Cu) ["based"? "traced"?] alloys of Al. Al-Cu alloys were highly used in WWII

    Page 1 of ["15"?] SELEE
    METALLURGICAL
    SERVICES

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Anonymous, thanks for your work on this. Much appreciated.

      Delete

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